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SPACE IS A UNIQUELY HOSTILE environment for humans and man-made spacecraft.
The physics of space makes orbital objects transparent and requires that they move in
predictable trajectories, heightening their possible vulnerability to attack by potential
adversaries. The history of human activity in space, therefore, has heen characterized
hy dangers from a number of hoth natural and man-made threats. Nevertheless, the
first 50 years of space activity have passed without direct conflict in space and without
the deployment of space-based weapons. How has this heen possible, and what are
the prospects for the future?
This article surveys the reasons for this relative success in space to date hy examin-
ing two key factors: the recognition hy the main space actors of shared threats posed
to their space security, and the political willingness of state leaders to cooperate in
diffusing these threats.' Neither of these two factors has heen inevitable at any point
since 1957, and yet states have often exercised cooperative restraint. This is a positive
outcome and even a surprising one, given the hostility ofthe early cold war years and
the period from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. The core space security agreements,
reached in the 1960s and early 1970s, endured throughout the cold war, as even the
most hawkish of U.S. presidents and Soviet general secretaries found collective ap-
proaches to space security to he in their best interests.
The 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
marked the first significant defection from this regime. While this action has spurred
debates over space weapons, the main reason behind it stemmed more from non-space
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threats: that is, the perceived threat of ballistic missiles to the United States and its
allies. But the United States—largely due to Congressional limitations and techni-
cal problems—has not yet exploited the ABM Treaty's demise to deploy space-based
weapons. Moreover, while the George W. Bush administration is on record opposing
new space agreements, technical and political factors are changing in a manner that
may start pulling U.S. space policy more into line with the traditions of cooperative
space security—a tradition followed even during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
If this shift: occurs, broader restraint-based agreements may be achievable, given U.S.
recognition of new debris-related threats and the presence of widespread international
support for enhanced space security cooperation.
This article first examines what worked in international space security cooperation
during the cold war and why. It looks particularly at the consensus agreements formed
at various times between the U.S. and Soviet leaderships regarding space threats, as
well as the gaps (and "hedging" behavior) that remained within this imperfect frame-
work. It then considers changes in the technical and political factors affecting current
space security—which is at risk because of the absence of such consensus and the lack
of ongoing discussions. Finally, it reconsiders the logic of space security cooperation
and suggests possible means of overcoming existing problems. Overall, both technical
and political factors, as in the past, will matter in the success—or failure—of future
agreements.
LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR
During the initial period of space security relations from 1957 to 1962, the Soviet
Union and the United States moved quickly to weaponize space, testing nuclear weap-
ons on nine occasions in space (plus two failed U.S. tests) and numerous more times
"There is an increasing danger that space '" *^ "/^ ^^  7 ° ^ ^ ' ^ ^"^ ""^
emitted harmful electro-magnetic
may become man's newest battiefield." puise (EMP) radiation that proved
hazardous to both satellites and humans in orbit. The July 1962 Starfish Prime test
alone disabled at least six U.S., British, and Soviet satellites. Still, both sides continued
to conduct more tests. The generally accepted perspective of space security was aptly
summed up by then-U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk's observation: "There is an
increasing danger that space may become man's newest battlefield."^ Virtually noth-
ing was accomplished in space security cooperation during this period due to initially
limited knowledge about space, the hostility of existing cold war military competition,
and the weakness of political support for meaningful cooperation.
By the fall of 1962, however, the two sides had begun to recognize that nuclear
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testing and unfettered military competition in space had self-damaging consequences
for both sides and increased the possibility of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis
stimulated a process of mutual learning that had already begun with regard to space.
Instead of continuing on the path to space war, U.S. President John F. Kennedy and
Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev took the unprecedented step of crafting a
series of formal and informal agreements, in order to protect space for passive military,
commercial, and scientific activities. The first step came in the banning of nuclear test-
ing in space (codified in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty), which was followed quickly
by a new consensual norm against territorial and military competition on the moon
(encompassed in the December 1963 UN Space Resolution). This progress did not
stop military space competition in reconnaissance satellites or civilian rivalry in human
spaceflight, but it made space considerably safer and reduced the chances of inadvertent
war. Later in the 1960s, ongoing U.S.-Soviet communication over space risks led to the
formation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which formalized the demilitarization of the
moon, banned the placement of weapons of mass destruction into orbit, called upon
states to engage in only "peaceftil purposes" in space, and encouraged consultations in
case of planned activities that might harm another country's space assets.
During the detente era (1970-1975), the U.S.-Soviet space security dialogue
continued both within the framework of nuclear arms control and beyond it. The two
sides enacted strict bans against interference with each other's reconnaissance satellites
and against testing and deploying space-based missile defenses (codified in the non-
interference clause in the Interim Agreement of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, respectively). Military support functions
continued to expand during this period, particularly in the areas of communications,
early warning, reconnaissance, and navigation. But prior Soviet tests of a convention-
ally armed, co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon now halted, and the United States
similarly refrained from such tests. The favorable political environment of 1970 to
1975 also led to unprecedented cooperation in space science and human spaceflight,
helping to expand the scope of mutual engagement and limit the incentives for space
conflict.
However, the decline of U.S.-Soviet political relations over such non-space issues
as mutual nuclear modernization and disputes in the Third World brought the end of
detente, causing less essential forms of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space science and
human spaceflight to wane. Importantly, however, the core of the space security frame-
work remained. Still, the period from 1976 to 1987 highlighted its gaps, as the Soviet
Union resumed its earlier co-orbital ASAT tests, and the United States began research
on and eventually conducted a test of its own ASAT weapon in 1985 (launched from
an F-15 aircraft). In 1983, moreover, the Reagan administration began a radically dif-
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ferent approach to space security by calling for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
a multi-tiered defensive system with extensive plans for space weapons. Ironically,
President Reagan's plan remained within the context of collective security, given his
ultimate (and oft-repeated) goal of cooperative nuclear elimination and the sharing
of SDI technology with the Soviet Union.^ In the end, a U.S. Congress unwilling to
violate the ABM Treaty and domestic changes in the Soviet Union caused the SDI issue
to hecome moot, allowing the two sides to move ahead with dramatic arms control
agreements and expanded space cooperation.
PROGRESS AND SUPPAGE IN THE POST-COLD WAR. PERIOD
During the 1990s, the framework of cooperative space security regained its strength and
hecame even more deeply rooted, as U.S.-Russian civil space cooperation hurgeoned
in the joint construction ofthe International Space Station (ISS). Industrial harriers
between the two sides hecame much smaller, as U.S. companies and former Soviet enter-
prises formed unprecedented joint ventures and shared in all phases of production and
mission planning for hoth the ISS and for private commercial flights. Meanwhile, even
as the United States began to expand its research activities in the area of hallistic missile
defense, the administration of President Bill Clinton hewed to a policy of negotiating a
demarcation agreement with Russia, rather than withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and
pursuing a unilateral approach. However, the Clinton administration failed to adopt
any significant new initiatives in the area of space security. Under pressure from the
Repuhlican-led Congress, it decided to pursue a limited missile defense test program,
_, _,. . . . . > •• I while also pre-conditioning the opening of
The Clinton administration failed ^^^ ^ ^^^^^^,^^ ^ ^^^ ,p,,, ,,^, ,„„„„!
to adopt any significant new initia- treaty at the UN conference on Disarma-
tives in the area of space security. "''''' (^^)' °" Chi ;
negotiations over a rissile Material Cut-CJrr
Treaty (FMCT). Similarly, as new actors emerged in space, the security framework
expanded from its previous bilateral context to an Increasingly complicated multilateral
negotiating arena. No progress would he made in plugging gaps in the existing space
security framework during the Clinton years.
The administration of Ceorge W. Bush hrought a very different perspective on
space security into office; it emphasized near-term withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
and the pursuit of active space defenses, and—if necessary—offensive systems. Aided
hy Democratic loyalty to the president following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush admin-
istration was able to double the missile defense hudget. It also announced in December
2001 plans to exit from the ABM Treaty (over Russian objections) and build nation-
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wide missile defenses. Programs to research a range of space-based weapons received a
new influx of funding. Meanwhile, work began on revisions to the 1996 U.S. National
Space Policy.
Accordingly, the U.S. stance at the CD in Geneva stiffened considerably, ruling
out even "discussions" on space security questions, despite a series of concessions by
China. As U.S. ambassador to the CD Eric Javits explained the U.S. position in 2002,
'"There simply is no problem in outer space for arms control to solve.'"* For the first
time, however, the United States found itself isolated in space security debates, as all
other major space powers supported talks toward plugging gaps in the existing space
security framework, both at the CD and at the United Nations. Only the United States
took the unprecedented step in the fall of 2005 of voting against the long-standing UN
resolution on Prevention ofan Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and Washington
also cast the only negative vote against a Russian-sponsored space resolution calling
for greater transparency in space activity.^  The administrations policy now seemed to
be a rejection, not only of prior multilateral efforts by the United States in space, but
also of the cooperative security approach of the Reagan administration, which had
engaged consistently in space security-related talks with the Soviet Union even as it
conducted research on SDI. The reasons for this move away from cooperative security
were threefold: the administrations perception of rising threats to U.S. space assets;
its belief that new international agreements would limit only U.S. capabilities and not
those of less treaty-conscious actors; and an assumption that national means would
be more effective in providing for U.S. security, even at the risk of inducing possible
foreign space weapon deployments. In many respects, the new administration adopted
a technologically deterministic view of space conflict, treating space weapons as es-
sentially inevitable and leaving open only the questions of what type, how many, and
when. To be the second to deploy such systems, supporters argued, was to risk being
"dead" in space.
But the administration's unilateralist space security policy began to face critics
even within the president's own party. By 2004, the Republican-led Congress began
to cut back funds for some of the administration's more controversial space-based
systems—such as the space-based laser—because of technical problems and mounting
costs. It eventually became apparent that despite the administration's early pro-space
weapons rhetoric, its main accomplishment in two terms of office would be the deploy-
ment of a small number of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, plus
additional Aegis missile defense systems aboard U.S. destroyers at sea. Indeed, in the
fall of 2006, conservative critics of the administration issued a report that lambasted
the Bush administration for failing to deploy space-based missile defenses.*
The official issuance of the revised U.S. National Space Policy in October 2006,
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however, reiterated the Bush administration's refusal to consider new treaties for space
security, implicitly rejecting any Reagan-era linkage between space defenses and arms
control/ It also asserted the U.S. right to deny space access to rivals, despite possible
ramifications such as the likely stimulation of foreign space military programs. Many
domestic and almost all foreign observers (including U.S. NATO allies) viewed the
administration's repudiation of both multilateral and cooperative security approaches as
harmful to the future of space security, leading to considerable criticism. The one excep-
tion to the Bush administration's non-engagement policy in space security concerned
debris mitigation, where the administration supported voluntary efforts through the
UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to adopt international
debris guidelines. However, these guidelines were not binding on states and therefore
did not ban weapons tests in space.
The sweeping election of a Democratic-led Congress in November 2006 has
changed the factors affecting the space security debate in two ways. First, the power
of the purse has now come under committee chairs in both the House of Representa-
tives and Senate largely critical of the Bush administration's hegemonic approach to
space security. Second, President Bush's swift removal of Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld—preceded and followed by a series of defections by top neo-conservatives
from the administration—moved the balance of power in space security decision mak-
ing to more moderate voices, such as the new secretary of defense, Robert Gates, and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
China's test of an ASAT weapon in January 2007 further shook the foundations of
the administration's largely isolationist space security policy, which had presumed that
future problems could be solved primarily by military means and without the need for
further space diplomacy. While critics from the right (such as Republican Senator Jon
Kyi) argued for near-term space weapons, internationalist opponents ofthe administra-
tion both in the United States and abroad argued that the threat of space debris now
required a more cooperative policy from the White House. For the first time, business
leaders—such as the head of Intelsat—broke ranks with the administration and called
for strict guidelines against debris and the initiation of international talks on banning
destructive ASAT testing.* Suddenly, technical factors had intervened to bring a dose
of reality to the previously highly polemical space security debate, as nearly all actors
recognized the futility of unilateral approaches to this collective problem.
FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE SPACE SECURITY
While the conditions infiuencing space security have changed markedly since the fall
of 2006, they have not yet brought significant new forms of cooperation. Still, there
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are signs that the ice of the past decade—beginning in the late Clinton years—is melt-
ing.
First, the Democratic-led Congress has become increasingly skeptical of plans
for space-based missile defenses and of the need for other space-based v^ e^apons. It also
questions their affordability. The current Congress is therefore working to revise U.S.
military space policy and adopt a stance calling for greater openness to international
cooperation as a tool for addressing space security threats.
Second, the Chinese ASAT test has been a shock to the international system,
releasing 35,000 pieces of debris, putting hundreds of spacecraft at risk of damage or
destruction, and placing the United States on notice that "space dominance" strategies
will be more complicated than their supporters once thought. More and more states,
their space agencies, and their militaries now realize that greater action is needed to
stem the rapidly worsening orbital debris problem. The international space industry is
also putting unprecedented pressure on national legislatures and international organi-
zations to enact concrete steps to protect their valuable assets in orbit. The passage by
COPUOS of a voluntary debris convention at its June 2007 meeting puts states on
record as opposing unnecessary debris generation, and it may also stimulate further
steps. Notably, the Bush administration quietly eased its policy of no discussions on
space security at the CD during its first session of 2007. Rather than stating its opposi-
tion (as in the National Space Policy), the administration now voiced its support for
such talks in tandem with Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations, thus putting
China and India (both FMCT holdouts) on the spot for blocking such efforts. While
the change may in part simply be tactical, the positive rhetoric may help bring some
progress toward addressing shared security problems in space.
Third, many senior officials in the U.S. Defense Department have gradually come
to realize that the most desirable stance for the United States in space is one of taking
the technological high road: developing non-destructive methods of defending U.S.
satellites and interfering with hostile spacecraft, as well as preparing for so-called "op-
erationally responsive" space capabilities.' The latter category refers to efforts to reduce
reliance on single spacecraft for critical military support functions and to develop the
ability to quickly replace any significant assets that might be damaged or destroyed
in a time of war. This strategy is believed by its supporters to be more effective, more
sustainable, more cost-effective, and less likely to generate hostile foreign reactions than
previous concepts of "space dominance."
Still, these positive changes in the direction of cooperative space security do not
decrease a series of remaining technical and political obstacles to future international
rules of the road (ad hoc agreements not to engage in harmful behavior) or more formal
measures (such as treaties). These include the difficulty of reaching and verifying agree-
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ments, the greater number of actors in space since the cold war, and the uncertainties
and mistrust that remain among major militaries in space—particularly between the
United States and China. The growing number of state and non-state actors in space
with access to military space technology via the international market also complicates
the current space security environment. Nevertheless, given the relatively lower levels
of political hostility among major space actors compared to the cold war, the increasing
capabilities of space surveillance technologies for verification, and the willingness of all
major states to at least consider new space security discussions, there are possibilities
that favorable agreements might be reached.
CONCLUSION
While this article does not predict the future success of international efforts to prevent
space conflicts, it does suggest that there are strong incentives for states to cooperate
in space. Historical experience, however, shows that creative and sustained national
leadership will be required if states are to overcome their mistrust and restrain natural
tendencies toward active defenses in space. Critical among these factors will be the
development and institutionalization of international space security talks toward a
reconceptualized framework. Such a framework should downplay the current state-
versus-state focus of many countries, and instead emphasize the notion of common
security against shared threats in space—threats such as traffic control, conflicting
broadcast frequencies, increasingly scarce geo-stationary orbital slots, and debris-pro-
ducing space weapons.'" Perhaps greater awareness of the range of multilateral technical
problems in space will encourage states to rethink some of their poUtical assumptions
about space competition, thus stimulating leaders to seek out new mechanisms for
restraint-based cooperation.
Nonetheless, holding out for perfect agreements in space security talks—such
as the complete bans on all possible means of space interference sought after by arms
control purists and the doubt-proof verification required by hard-line skeptics—will
continue to be the enemy of many good (and useful) space security agreements, unless
national leaders show increased pragmatism. As in past periods, real-life agreements
will never provide perfect security against all possible technologies of interference, and
verification mechanisms will never be able to "prove" the complete absence of weapons-
related capabilities (although they will get better and better at detecting and limiting
them). However, partial or incremental solutions—such as rules of the road or specific
bans against destructive ASAT testing—might work well enough to prevent near-term
space conflict, if the relevant actors are willing. Steady engagement among key players
over time may then have the chance to limit hostility and mistrust, leading to even
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better mechanisms. This type of step-by-step approach is not ideal, but, as both past
and recent events have shown, it will likely serve the interests of all parties in space
more effectively than taking no steps at all. ^
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1. Space security is defined here as the ability to access and use space without fear that one's space assets
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2. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (address, 16 June 1962), U.S. State Department Bulletin, 2 July
1962.
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8. See, for example, an opinion piece by Intelsat Chief Executive Officer David McGIade, "Preserving
the Orbital Environment," Space News, 19 February 2007.
9. See, for example, the negative comments by Air Force Undersecretary for Space Programs Gary
Payton about kinetic-energy ASATs in Jeremy Singer, "USAF Interest in Lasers Triggers Concerns About
Anti-Satellite Weapons," Space News, 1 May 2006.
10. On common security and its differences from collective security, see K.K. Nair, Space: The Frontiers of
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